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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). The Utah 
Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether or not the trial court erred in failing to grant 
plaintiff's motion to set aside pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 60(b) where good cause in support thereof was 
shown and judgment was the result of either (a) the trial court's 
failure to realize that plaintiffs had filed a brief relative to 
the motion in question, or (b) plaintiffs' reliance upon the 
statements of the trial court as to the opportunity to complete 
discovery. 
The decision of the trial court under Rule 60(b) is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. "Where there is doubt about 
whether a default should be set aside, the doubt should be 
resolved in favor of doing so, to the end that each party may have 
an opportunity to present his side of the controversy and that 
there be a resolution in accordance with law and justice." 
Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Aala Dev. Corp.. 611 P.2d 369, 371 
(Utah 1980). [R. 193-194] 
II. Whether or not the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment where plaintiff had established as an undisputed fact 
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that insurance proceeds were wrongfully paid to defendant and 
where any other fact that would have supported summary judgment 
were at the very least in dispute. 
The standard of review on summary judgment requires that all 
facts and inferences be construed in favor of the party against 
whom summary judgment was entered. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 56; Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982); Bowen 
v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) ; Beehive Brick Co. v. 
Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1988). [R. 195] 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. (A copy of Rule 56 is 
attached as Addendum, Exhibit "E.") 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). (A copy of Rule 60 is 
attached as Addendum, Exhibit "E.") 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Knudson initiated a foreclosure against the Subject 
Property, described below. He did so with the full knowledge that 
his execution was wrongful. He did so with the knowledge that the 
title to the Subject Property was covered by title insurance, and 
with the intent that he could recover insurance proceeds without 
discovery by the insurer of the wrongful nature of the execution. 
In its capacity as insurer, in order to prevent execution 
against the Subject Property, Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. 
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("ATGF") paid money to defendant Knudson to stop the execution. 
Following the sale, ATGF investigated its subrogation rights and 
subsequently obtained documents showing that the execution was 
wrongfully brought by David Knudson. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 
Section 38-9-1, ATGF provided the same information and demanded 
that David Knudson correct the damages resulting from his wrongful 
lien on the subject property. Mr. Knudson has failed and refused 
to do so. Subsequently, ATGF brought an action against defendant 
Knudson for wrongful lien, slander of title and restitution of the 
insurance money wrongfully paid. 
ATGF brought a motion for summary judgment against David 
Knudson. Defendant Knudson filed a cross motion for summary 
judgment. The trial court indicated that it was interested in 
having further evidence of the knowledge of Mr. Knudson at the 
time he foreclosed on the property. ATGF informed the trial court 
that if the trial court considered the element of knowledge at the 
time of the execution to be important, then the individual who 
sold the judgment to Mr. Knudson would provide an affidavit that 
Mr. Knudson was informed of the release of the property from the 
judgment at the time that Mr. Knudson purchased the judgment. 
Significantly, defendant Knudson never sought to dispute by 
affidavit or other evidence the pleadings stating that he had the 
knowledge in question, but in support of his cross motion for 
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summary judgment merely relied upon the absence of an affidavit 
from plaintiffs at the time. The trial court stated that it would 
not render a decision on either motion for summary judgment until 
the completion of discovery. 
Subsequently, the trial court apparently lost track of the 
status of the case and entered summary judgment in favor of 
defendant Knudson on the apparent basis that plaintiffs had failed 
to timely file a memorandum in opposition to the motion. A series 
of pleadings were filed in order to clarify the situation. The 
affidavit in question and other documents further supporting 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs were also filed. However, 
the trial court declined to set aside its order granting summary 
j udgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The procedural facts and the disputed and undisputed material 
facts presented to the trial court, and which are relevant to this 
appeal, consisted of the following: 
1. The real property which constitutes the subject matter 
of this dispute is located at 1159 South 900 West, Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 84104 (the "Subject Property"). 
(Unless specified otherwise, all references to the record in this 
statement of facts are to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgments 
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dated December 20, 199 and the memorandum and supporting 
evidence.) [R. 55] 
2. Prior to plaintiffs' ownership of the Subject Property, 
the same was subject to a judgment against a prior owner of the 
property, Margaret Wendler Hill, filed April 2, 1991 and docketed 
April 9, 1991 as No. 2164604, in the amount of $10,564.91 (the 
"Judgment"). [R. 55] 
3. On or about August 12, 1991, the holder of the Judgment, 
defendant Guaranty National Ins. Co., released the Subject 
Property with respect to the Judgment. [R. 55] 
4. In the summer of 1995, defendant Knudson contacted 
defendant Guaranty National Ins. Co. and requested that he be 
permitted to purchase the Judgment. [Affidavit of Karen James, 
paragraph 3.] [R. 215, 248] 
5. Karen James, an employee of defendant Guaranty National 
Ins. Co., expressly informed defendant Knudson that Guaranty 
National Ins. Co. had released the Subject Property as to the 
Judgment and defendant Knudson acknowledge the same. [Affidavit 
of Karen James, paragraph 5.][R. 215, 249] The files of Guaranty 
National Ins. Co. as to the judgment, containing the release and 
partial satisfaction and so forth, were all available to defendant 
Knudson. Nevertheless, defendant Knudson expressly stated that he 
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was unconcerned with the release and failed to request the file. 
[Affidavit of Karen James, paragraphs 5 and 6.][R. 215, 249] 
6. Defendant Knudson purchased the Judgment from defendant 
Guaranty National Ins. Co. for the sum of $1,000.00. [Affidavit 
of Karen James, paragraph 5.] [R. 215, 249] 
7. Thereafter, defendant Knudson purporting to have 
obtained an assignment of the judgment, initiated a foreclosure 
action against the Subject Property and, on or about September 19, 
1995, recorded a notice of sheriff's levy against the Subject 
Property. [R. 55] 
8. Plaintiffs Rollins and their insurer ATGF subsequently 
received notice of the sheriff's levy against the Subject 
Property. In order to prevent execution against the Subject 
Property to the detriment of a subsequent purchaser, plaintiffs, 
on or about November 29, 1995, paid defendant Knudson the amount 
of $11,514.91 in satisfaction of the Judgment, consisting of 
$10,564.91 for the judgment, $700.00 in attorney's fees to 
defendant Knudson's attorney and $250.00 as the costs of the 
sheriff's sale. [R. 55-56] 
9. On or about August 22, 1996, plaintiffs made written 
demand upon defendant Knudson to correct his wrongful lien, as 
defined in Utah Code Ann., Section 38-9-1. [R. 56] 
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10. Defendant Knudson failed and refused to correct the 
damages caused by his wrongful lien, notwithstanding actual 
knowledge imparted by the above described demand letter. 
[R. 56] 
11. On or about February 7, 1997 the plaintiffs and 
defendant Knudson appeared before the trial court to argue cross 
motions for summary judgment. [See trial court docket, February 
7, 1997. A true and correct copy of the trial court docket is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A."][R. 273] 
12. Based on an affidavit filed by plaintiffs, pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(f), the trial court 
declined to render a decision at that time. The trial court 
directed that parties should complete discovery and then bring 
their motions again. At the hearing, the Trial Court expressly 
stated that summary judgment would not be ruled upon until 
discovery was completed. No deadline was set and the Court's 
statement was not qualified in any way. The complete statement of 
the Court was the summary judgment would not be ruled upon until 
discovery was complete. [See trial court docket, January 31, 
1997, February 7, 1997 and February 25, 1997.][R. 273] 
13. Before plaintiffs had completed the intended discovery 
and refiled their motion for summary judgment, defendant Knudson 
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attempted to resubmit his motion for summary judgment. [See trial 
court docket, February 10, 1997.][R. 273] 
14. Again, the trial court issued a minute entry, dated 
February 25, 1997, expressly stating that the trial court would 
not rule on defendant Knudson's cross-motion for summary judgment 
until the completion of discovery for both motions. Counsel for 
plaintiffs and appellants also reviewed the docket of the case 
thereafter. The entry in the docket for February 25, 1997 states, 
"The Court will not rule on deft. Knudson's cross-motion for 
summary judgment until the completion of discovery has been done 
for both motions." [See trial court docket, February 25, 1997.] 
[R. 273] 
15. On May 21, 1997, defendants filed a notice to submit, 
yet again. [See trial court docket, May 21, 1997.] [R. 273] 
16. In response, plaintiffs filed another Rule 56(f) 
affidavit for the purpose of advising the trial court that they 
were still engaged in discovery. [See trial court docket, May 28, 
1997.][R. 273] 
17. Without further opportunity for plaintiffs to be heard, 
the trial court granted defendant Knudson's motion for summary 
judgment. [See trial court docket, May 29, 1997; Order, dated 
July 7, 1997, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B."][R. 180-182, 274] 
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18. Plaintiffs completed necessary discovery and timely 
filed a motion pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
60(b) to set aside the summary judgment, dated September 9. 1997. 
The Rule 60(b) motion was supported by an accompanying memorandum 
as well as additional evidence developed and plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment addressing the merits of the case. [See 
trial court docket, September 10, 1997 the Motions and Memoranda, 
dated September 9, 1997] [R. 189-250] 
19. On September 25, 1997, the trial court issued a minute 
entry stating that it found that plaintiffs had missed a deadline 
under Rule 4-501, C.J.A. and that missing such a deadline was an 
insufficient basis to set aside the summary judgment. [A true and 
correct copy of the minute entry is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C."][R. 265-267] 
20. Notwithstanding plaintiffs' efforts to bring to the 
Court's attention that (1) no deadlines were missed, and (2) that 
the sole reason that plaintiff's further evidence and motion for 
summary judgment was not earlier presented was due to reliance on 
the trial court's earlier statements that the parties should 
complete discovery before a decision would be rendered, the trial 
court entered an Order, dated October 26, 1997, denying 
plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion. [A true and correct copy of the 
Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "D."][R. 238-285] 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court should have granted plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) 
Motion to Set Aside the order in question. The standard 
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Interstate Excavating, 
Inc. v. Aala Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980) was clearly met 
by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' counsel was clearly taken by surprise 
by the ruling of the trial court which came after the trial court 
had expressly informed the parties that a ruling would not be made 
until the completion of discovery. The trial court had apparently 
lost track of the case and erroneously entered the summary 
judgment as a default. The Rule 60(b) motion was timely filed and 
supported by pleadings showing that plaintiffs would prevail on 
the merits of the case. 
The summary judgment in question was in error in any event. 
Plaintiffs actually filed the initial motion for summary judgment 
and provided evidence of undisputed facts entitling them to 
judgment on the merits against defendant Knudson. It was an 
undisputed fact from the outset that insurance money had been 
wrongfully paid to defendant. Therefore, summary judgment could 
never have been rendered in favor of defendant. In response to 
the request of the trial court a further affidavit establishing 
the knowledge of the defendant was later provided. The trial 
court was informed of this affidavit from the outset. Defendant 
10 
never submitted evidence as to his knowledge at the time of the 
execution in question, thus, never placing plaintiffs under the 
burden of producing the counter affidavit in question. In any 
event, because it was apparent that plaintiffs would prevail on 
the merits of the action, the standard for summary judgment was 
never met by defendant Knudson. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS' 
RULE 60(b) MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT IN QUESTION, 
In support of their Rule 60(b) motion, plaintiffs submitted 
to the trial court the Affidavit of Karen James, which affidavit 
proved the allegations of plaintiffs' various causes of action 
against defendant David Knudson, dba Knute IV, LLC. 
[R. 189-250; 248-249] 
Also submitted to the trial court in conjunction with the 
Rule 60(b) motion was a motion for leave to file amended 
complaint, memorandum in support and proposed second amended 
complaint, a motion for summary judgment and memorandum in 
support, and plaintiffs' first set of discovery to defendant David 
Knudson. [R. 189-250] 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) provides in 
pertinent part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
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representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect .... 
There is a strong preference in the law that cases be decided 
upon their merits. The Utah Supreme Court stated in Interstate 
Excavating, Inc. v. Aala Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), 
"where there is doubt about whether a default should be set aside, 
the doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end that 
each party may have an opportunity to present his side of the 
controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with law 
and justice." Id. at 371. 
In the present case, plaintiff was attentive to the matter. 
Counsel timely filed Rule 56(f) affidavits and objected to the 
proposed summary judgment prior to its entry. The trial court had 
already stated would permit plaintiff to complete discovery and 
respond appropriately in the matter without a decision being 
rendered on summary judgment. The trial court had specifically 
not set a time limit within which the affidavit of Karen James and 
the pleadings needed to be submitted. 
A reasonably prudent person would have relied upon the 
statements of the trial court that, "The Court will not rule on 
deft. Knudson's cross-motion for summary judgment until the 
completion of discovery has been done for both motions." See 
statement of facts, above, nos. 2 and 3. 
12 
Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants were engaged in 
discovery and acting with reasonable diligence. Counsel acted in 
a timely fashion in completing discovery, advising the trial court 
that discovery was continuing and in making a Rule 60(b) motion. 
See statement of facts, above, nos. 5, 6 and 7. 
Perhaps another attorney would have acted with greater 
dispatch that this counsel. However, this counsel was completely 
taken aback both by the entry of summary judgment and by the 
failure of the trial court to grant to Rule 60(b) motion. This 
counsel would certainly have acted with greater dispatch had their 
been indication that the Court had a deadline in mind after 
indicating directly to counsel that discovery was to be completed 
and both the motion for summary judgment and the cross-motion for 
summary judgment were to be again submitted together for ruling by 
the Court. This counsel acted with all possible diligence in 
completing that discovery and timely filing a Rule 60(b) motion 
together with the further evidence and motion for summary 
judgment. 
The trial court's decision to deny plaintiffs and appellants 
Rule 60(b) motion was an abuse of discretion. This counsel has no 
objection to being held to a deadline. This counsel has no 
objection to the entry of a default when a party fails to respond 
at all. However, there is something very arbitrary in refusing to 
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set aside a default where (1) there is reason for counsel to 
believe that a deadline has not been set, (2) counsel has timely 
communicated with the trial court prior to the entry of default, 
and (3) following default counsel has timely acted to remedy every 
element of the default—including the presentation of the merits. 
Until the trial court actually denied plaintiffs' motion to 
set aside judgment, counsel believed that the judgment was 
rendered to dispose of the matter only if plaintiffs did not 
timely prepare the further matters submitted and make a motion to 
set aside the judgment. Counsel would not have guessed that the 
trial court would refuse to set aside the judgment where no 
deadline had been given and counsel had been attentive enough to 
file a Rule 56(f) affidavit advising the trial court that 
plaintiffs were still engaged in discovery. 
Summary judgment was entered in the matter as the result of 
plaintiffs' excusable neglect. The above described affidavits and 
pleadings were not earlier filed primarily as a result of the fact 
that no deadlines had been set for submission thereof and 
plaintiff was unaware of the need to earlier file the same. 
Plaintiffs submitted two Rule 56(e) affidavits, including one just 
a few days prior to the entry of summary judgment. [See trial 
court docket attached hereto as Exhibit "A."] 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT DAVID KNUDSON BASED ON 
THE MERIT'S OF THE CASE. 
Plaintiff submitted evidence and further pleadings sufficient 
not only to defeat the summary judgment, but in fact to obtain a 
summary judgment as against defendant Knudson. [R. 51-76; 115-
143; 189-250] The merits of the case are such that it would be 
unjust to permit summary judgment to stand in favor of defendant 
Knudson, where the summary judgment is the result of excusable 
neglect and not a decision of the merits as more fully presented. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, governing the entry 
of summary judgment, has been addressed extensively by the courts. 
It is a matter of blackletter law that summary judgment should be 
granted only when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable 
probability that the party moved against could prevail. Frisbee 
v. K&K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389-90 (Utah 1984); FMA 
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). 
All facts and inferences must be construed in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgement. Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 56; Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 
(Utah 1982); Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 
1982); Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 
(Utah App. 1988). 
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A. David Knudson Is Liable For Uniust Enrichment And ATGF Is 
Entitled To Restitution. 
Plaintiffs' most significant Cause of Action concerns the 
right of the insurance company to recover insurance money 
wrongfully paid. Utah law requires the repayment of insurance 
money wrongfully paid. In Utah State Dept. of Social Servs. v. 
Toscano, 624 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1981), the Supreme Court required 
repayment of financial assistance made on the basis of a factual 
error. [R. 138] In so holding, the Supreme Court cited the 
Restatement of Restitution. 
Restatement of Restitution, section 23, at 101, states, 
(1) A person is entitled to restitution from another to whom 
he has paid his own money because of the erroneous belief 
induced by mistake of fact, 
(a) that he was thereby performing the terms of a contract 
between a third person and the payee, which contract 
never existed, or had been avoided or otherwise 
discharged, or 
(b) that he was performing a noncontractual duty owed by a 
third person to the payee, which duty was not owed, or 
(c) that an excessive amount paid was required for the 
performance of a duty, contractual or otherwise, owed by 
a third person to the payee. 
Comment b. states, 
The rule stated in this section applies both were the payor 
would have had a duty to the third person to make the payment 
if the facts were as the payor believed, as in the case of an 
insurer, and ... 
(emphasis added). [R. 138-139] For the requirements in other 
specific circumstances, see also 66 Am Jur 2d, Restitution and 
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Implied Contracts, section 13 (mistake), section 118 (money paid 
by mistake), section 121 (mistake of fact as to title, authority 
or quantity). [R. 139] 
In the present case, defendant Knudson admitted from the very 
outset that the insurance money was wrongfully paid. [R. 98-101] 
ATGF paid money to defendant Knudson on the mistaken belief that 
the property, and thus the owners and warrantors thereof, were 
responsible for the judgment in question. According to the 
Restatement, and Utah law, ATGF is entitled to restitution. 
Defendant paid only $1,000.00 to Guaranty National Ins. Co. 
for purchase of the Judgment. Clearly, defendant Knudson has been 
unjustly enriched by the greatly disproportionate amount of money 
wrongfully paid by the insurance company. 
In this case, the insurance company acted on a mistaken 
belief. Defendant Knudson, on the other hand, knew or should have 
known that he was not entitled execute against the Subject 
Property and that he was not entitled to the insurance money paid. 
B. The Documents Recorded By David Knudson In Connection With The 
Sheriffs' Sale Constituted A Wrongful Lien. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 38-9-1, provides: 
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance 
against, real property, who causes or has caused a document 
asserting that claim to be recorded or filed in the office of 
the county recorder, who knows or has reason to know that the 
document is forged, groundless, or contains a material 
misstatement or false claim, is liable to the owner or title 
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holder for $1,000 or for treble damages, whichever is greater, 
and for reasonable attorney fees, and costs as provided in 
this chapter, if he willfully refuses to release or correct 
such document of record within 20 days from the date of 
written request from the owner or beneficial title-holder of 
the real property. This chapter is not intended to be 
applicable to mechanics' or materialmen's liens. 
David Knudson received a letter from ATGF on or about August 
22, 1996. A copy of the Amended Complaint was included with the 
letter, clearly describing the facts showing that the documents 
recorded by David Knudson in furtherance of the Sheriff's sale 
constituted a wrongful lien against the subject property. 
Moreover, defendant Knudson was aware at the time of his wrongful 
execution that he had initiated a wrongful execution. All of the 
information with respect thereto was available to defendant 
Knudson, and he knew or should have known all of the details as to 
the earlier release of the Subject Property as to the Judgment. 
The undisputed evidence shows that the Subject Property was 
released as to the Judgment, defined above, on or about August 12, 
1991. Therefore, execution against the Subject Property was 
improper. 
The Affidavit of Karen James shows that defendant Knudson was 
aware at the time he initiated the execution against the Subject 
Property that the Subject Property was released as to the 
Judgment. The Affidavit of Karen James also shows that the 
information with respect to the release was fully available to 
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defendant Knudson at all relevant times, but that defendant 
Knudson expressly declined to review the same. Therefore, 
defendant Knudson was aware at the time that execution against the 
Subject Property was improper. 
As further identified in the statement of facts, the 
undisputed evidence further shows that defendant Knudson did file 
an execution against the Subject Property on or about September 
19, 1995, by recording a notice of sheriff's levy against the 
Subject Property. 
The undisputed evidence further shows that ATGF did suffer 
damages in the amount of $11,514.91 as a result of the wrongful 
lien. 
It was further undisputed that defendant Knudson has failed 
and refused to correct the damages caused by his wrongful lien 
despite actual notice of the wrongful nature thereof. 
Therefore, judgment must be rendered against David Knudson 
for the damages caused by his wrongful lien. 
C. David Knudson Is Liable For Slander Of Title. 
As described above, defendant Knudson knew and should have 
known that the documents he filed pursuant to his execution 
against the Subject Property constituted false claims against the 
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Subject Property, inasmuch as the Subject Property was released by 
Guaranty National Ins. Co. as to the Judgment. 
Defendant Knudson's own motion for summary judgment 
challenged only the malice element of plaintiffs' cause of action 
for Slander of Title. Defendant Knudson asserted that plaintiffs 
had not presented evidence sufficient to establish the malice 
element. The Affidavit of Karen James now satisfies the burden of 
proof as to the element of malice. The mere fact that the files 
showing the release of the Judgment as to the Subject Property 
were available to defendant Knudson and that he expressly ignored 
them is sufficient to establish malice, as discussed below. 
However, that is not the limit of defendant Knudson's malice. He 
was expressly informed of the release of the Subject Property, and 
proceeded against the Subject Property notwithstanding--secure in 
his belief that the insurance company would be unaware of the 
release until he was paid off. 
Utah case law discusses the application of term of ''malice" 
as to an action for slander of title. In Olsen v. Kidman, 235 
P.2d 510, 512-13 (Utah 1951), the Supreme Court found that a 
realtor committed a slander of title because the realtor did not 
have the right to lien the property for his commission. The 
Supreme Court held that actual malice need not be present. Id. 
The Supreme Court stated, "As in an action for defamation, if the 
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other essentials to liability are present, the publisher of the 
disparaging matter takes the risk that it is untrue." Id. at 513. 
The Supreme Court made a finding of implied malice because the 
lien on the property was improper, despite the realtor's honest 
belief that it was permitted. Id. In the present case, defendant 
Knudson knew or should have known that the subject property had 
been released as to the judgment. Therefore, implied malice will 
be found to exist. 
In Gillmor v. Cumminas, 904 P.2d 703, 707-08 (Utah App. 
1995), the Court upheld a judgment for slander of title, including 
a finding of malice, in a case very much like the present case. 
The defendant testified that he had access to the relevant records 
describing the boundaries to his property. Id. at 708. The 
defendant hired a surveyor and used the descriptions generated by 
the surveyor in deeds issued to a third party. Jd. at 705 and 
708. The surveyor testified that he was not given the relevant 
records to assist him in surveying. 1^. at 708. The defendant 
admitted that he did not check the conflicting legal descriptions 
before using the incorrect legal descriptions created by the 
surveyor. Id. at 708. In the present case, defendant Knudson 
similarly acted with disregard to the information known to him, or 
which was available to him. Even if defendant Knudson asserts 
that he was not expressly told of the release by Karen James, the 
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mere fact that he failed to obtain and review the file concerning 
the Judgment is sufficient to satisfy the malice element, pursuant 
to Gillmor v. Cumminas, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
Our system of justice provides a mechanism which allows 
defaults to be set aside based on circumstances where an attorney 
makes a mistake concerning a deadline or otherwise may not have 
been as diligent as he should have been. This mechanism is 
critical so that the parties themselves have fair opportunity for 
their case to be heard. Especially in a case such as this, 
involving insurance fraud, the interests of justice require that 
the merits be presented. Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants 
was not so lacking in diligence or justification so as to justify 
penalizing the parties themselves. 
Without regard to the foregoing, summary judgment should not 
have been entered in this case. Plaintiffs were entitled to 
prevail, they provided adequate evidence in support of their 
entitlement to proceed on the merits. It was only upon an 
oversight by the trial court that summary judgment was entered 
without making reference to the evidence or the merits. 
DATED this day of December, 1998. 
Thor B. Roundy & 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Represented by: THOR B ROUNDY 
Defendant - RAUL ALVA 
Represented by: MARK O MORRIS 
Plaintiff - EDWARD ROLLINS 
Represented by: THOR B ROUNDY 
Plaintiff - SHANEN ROLLINS 
Represented by: THOR B ROUNDY 
Defendant - ELAINE ALVA 
Represented by: MARK O MORRIS 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
310.00 
310.00 
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Mark 0. Morris (A4636) 
Daniel E. Garrison (A7207) 
SNELL & WILMER LLP. 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Broadway Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-1900 
Facsimile: (801)237-1950 
OaputyClof.: 
Attorneys for Defendant David Knudson dba Knute IV, LLC 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ATTORNEYS'TITLE GUARANTEE FUND, ; 
INC., a Colorado corporation, and EDWARD ] 
ROLLINS and SHANEN ROLLINS aka ; 
SHANEN DAVIS, individuals, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
RAUL ALVA, ELAINE ALVA, DAVID ] 
KNUDSON, dba KNUTE IV, LLC, ] 
individuals, and GUARANTY NATIONAL ] 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah corporation,; 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER OF SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
) DAVID KNUDSON 
) Civil No. 960903326CV 
) Judge Frank G. Noel 
On December 19, 1996, Plaintiffs Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund, Inc. and Edward and 
Shanen Rollins (the "Plaintiffs"), filed a Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Motion"), 
seeking judgme^ against Defendant David Knudson. On January 21, 1997, Knudson filed a Cross-
GARRTDVSir* 
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Motion for Summary Judgment ("Knudson's Cross-Motion") and a consolidated Memorandum 
in Opposition to Plaintifis' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Knudson's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Knudson's Supporting Memorandum"). 
On January 30, 1997, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. On January 30, 1997, and again on January 31, 1997, counsel for Plaintiffs 
filed a Rule 56(f) Affidavit, indicating his need to conduct discovery on certain issues prior to 
Knudson's Cross-Motion being submitted for decision. Before briefing was completed on 
Knudson's Cross-Motion, a hearing was held on February 7,1997 on Plaintiffs' Motion. Based on 
Plaintiffs' counsel's Rule 56(f) Affidavit, the Court deferred consideration of Knudson's Cross-
Motion until after Plaintiffs had been given an opportunity to conduct limited discovery. The Court 
also denied Plaintiffs' Motion without prejudice. 
Between February 7, 1997, and May 21, 1997, a period of 103 days, counsel for Plaintiffs 
conducted no discovery. On May 21, 1997, Knudson's counsel submitted a Renewed Notice to 
Submit for Decision, notifying the Court that over 90 days had passed without any discovery being 
propounded by the Plaintiffs, and renewing Knudson's Cross-Motion that he was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. On May 28, 1997, counsel for Plaintiffs filed another Rule 56(f) 
affidavit which was identical in wording to the Rule 56(f) affidavits previously filed. The Court 
reviewed the file, found good cause for the entry of summary judgment and entered a Minute Entry 
on May 29, 1997 granting Knudson's Cross-Motion for the reasons stated in Knudson's Supporting 
GARRISD\SLC\45633.1 2 
Memorandum. For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown; and in accordance with this 
Court's May 29,1997 Minute Entry, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 56 U.RC.P., this Court finds that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and that Knudson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, all claims of Plaintiffs against Knudson are hereby dismissed with prejudice and onthe 
merits, costs to be determined pursuant to Rule 54 upon entry of final judgment herein. 
DATED this ""] day o&ane^997. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABfcrFRAl^K G. NOEL 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
GARR1SD\SIXU563:! J 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund, Inc., : MINUTE ENTRY 
a Colorado corporation and Edward : 
Rollins and Shanen Rollins, a/k/a : 
Shanen Davis, individuals, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
: CASE NO: 960903326 CV 
vs. : 
: JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
Raul Alva, Elaine Alva, David Knudson, 
d/b/a Knute IV, LLC individuals, and : 
Guaranty National Insurance Company, : 
a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants- : 
The court has reviewed the plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside the Summary Judgment. The 
grounds for the motion is that the summary judgment was entered as a result of plaintiffs' 
excusable neglect. The only excusable neglect referred to, that the court can determine, is that 
» 
plaintiffs were unaware of deadlines that had been set for submission of the papers in connection 
with the Motion for Summary Judgment. This appears to the court to be the heart of plaintiffs' 
claim. The deadlines referred to presumably are the deadlines which are clearly stt out in the 
court's rules, Rule 4-501, C.J.A.. The court feels that this is an insufficient basis to set aside 
the entry of the summary judgment and therefore will deny the motion. 
ATTORNEYS' V. ALVA PAGE TWO 
Counsel for defendants 
Dated ±is3£__
 day o f September, 
is to prepare an appropriate order. 
1997. 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following this cr>4c7day of September, 1997. 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
230 South 500 East, Suite 270 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Cameron M. Hancock 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorney for Defendants 
P. O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Mark O. Morris 
Daniel E. Garrison 
SNELL & WILMER 
Attorney for Defendant Knudson 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Broadway Center 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
Mark O. Monis (A4636) 
Daniel E. Garrison (A7207) 
S N E L L & W T L M E R L L P . 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Broadway Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 237-1950 
Attorneys for Defendant David Knudson dba Knute IV, LLC 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ATTORNEYS'TITLE GUARANTEE FUND, ] 
INC., a Colorado corporation, and EDWARD ] 
ROLLINS and SHANEN ROLLINS aka ] 
SHANEN DAVIS, individuals, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
RAUL ALVA, ELAINE ALVA, DAVID ] 
KNUDSON, dba KNUTE IV, LLC, ] 
individuals, and GUARANTY NATIONAL ] 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER DENYING 
) RULE 60(b) MOTION, AND 
} GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE 
i Civil No. 960903326CV 
) Judge Frank G. Noel 
On May 29, 1997, this Court issued a Minute Entry granting the Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by Defendant David Knudson dba Knute IV, LLC ("Knudson"). In response to 
Knudson's proposed Order of Summary Judgment in Favor of David Knudson, filed on June 9, 
1997, Plaintiffs / - =v's Title Guaranty Fund, Edward Rollins and Shanen Rollins (collectively, 
1ARRJSD" 
OCT 2 6 1997 
SALT 
BY DEPUTY flMESpK 
"Plaintiffs"), through their counsel, Thor B. Roundy, filed an "Objection to Defendant's Proposed 
Order of Summary Judgment in Favor of David Knudson; Motion for Reconsideration and to Set 
Discovery Deadlines," dated June 13,1997. In a Minute Entry dated July 8,1997, this Court rejected 
Plaintiffs' arguments for reconsideration and noted that it had signed the Order of Summary 
Judgment in Favor of David Knudson on July 7, 1997. 
On or about September 9, 1997, counsel for Plaintiffs filed a "Rule 60(B) Motion to Set 
Aside Summary Judgment," and supporting memorandum ("Rule 60(b) Motion"); a "Motion for 
Leaveto File Amended Complaint," and supporting memorandum ("Motion to Amend"); a "Motion 
for Summary Judgment," and supporting memorandum ("Summary Judgment Motion"); the 
affidavits of Brian Coleman, Karen James and Thor B. Roundy, apparently submitted in support of 
either the Motion for Summary Judgment or the Motion to Amend Complaint ("Affidavits"); and 
"Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Requests for 
Admissions to Defendant David Knudson" ("Discovery Requests"). In response, Knudson filed a 
memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion, and moved to strike the remaining pleadings and 
requests concurrently filed therewith. Plaintiff filed a reply brief and a notice to submit the matter 
for decision. 
Having reviewed the memoranda filed with the court, and considering the procedural history, 
including this Court's already having considered and denied Plaintiffs Reconsideration Motion; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) Motion is DENTED, and Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend, Summary Judgment Motion, Affidavits and 
GARRISDVSLO05! 587.01 ? 
Discovery Requests are STRICKEN for the 
not at the time the aforementioned documents were filed) 
reason that Defendant David Knudson is not (and was 
S- a party to this action. 
DATED this £?ft day of October, 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable F; 
Third District 
GAJUUSDVSLOOJ1587.01 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the jp^ 3 3 day of September, 1997,1 served a true and accurate copy 
of the foregoing [PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING RULE 60(b) MOTION, AND GRANTING 
MOTION TO STRIKE upon the following named persons by hand delivery to: 
THOR B. ROUND Y, ESQ. 
230 SOUTH 500 EAST, SUITE 270 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 34102 
and by first class mail to: 
CAMERON M. HANCOCK, ESQ. 
RAY, QUTNNEY & NEBEKER 
79 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 400 
P.O. BOX 45385 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145 
$sn/r/tf?^£ P/tuL 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Opening default or default judgment cli 
to have been obtained because of attor 
mistake as to time or place of appear 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A L] 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application fori 
fault judgment where notice is required 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to aj 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United Sta 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of \ 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 92 tojJ§H 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 1152 to 1213. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterch 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after> 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after servicS 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or witlwS 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all orlSI 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim?! 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any tanf 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment m 1 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at lc 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior jbp^ 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought aha 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories! 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that thereiy 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is eritifleoRl 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutor 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although therefj 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under thigjj 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, sn| 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantialjt 
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controvei 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without] 
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damageus 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings JtoT] 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly-
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. SupftUj 
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, sha l lH 
EkU.t w 
149 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
OT ftirther affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
6J otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
* (0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
^Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rul« 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit*. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
-^consistency with deposition. 
i K ? * ° f °PPosinS affidavits. 
—nesting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
"^Sufficiency. 
TT^Jfcarsay and opinion testimony. 
• W " ^ g Pleadings. 
S a W * defenses 
.-Verified pleading. 
^ S S * o f right to contest. 
^"•^unavailable. 
1 2 2 * ^ 6 defense. 
| o interrogatories. 
ft. m-affected party. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Notice. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
'"ade in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
m
 Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
ivil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
Leal , 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
ages for personal injury or death in actions un-
der Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS 
§§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
189. 
Key Numbers. — New Trial <s=> 13 et seq., 
110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
to set aside judgment, § 21-1-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment. 
—-Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
